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Teilhard de Chardin’s Evolutionary Natural Theology 
 
Abstract 
 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin develops, as is well-known, a model of evolution as a convergent 
progression from primordial multiplicity, through increasing degrees of complexity, towards 
a final Omega point of spiritual consummation.  (i) This article explores how Teilhard fuses 
Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of evolution in developing his own, and in particular his 
defence of the view that Lamarckism is fundamental to a proper understanding of evolution’s 
human phase.  (ii) The article demonstrates how Teilhard’s scientific interpretation of 
evolution is inspired by Christian cosmological insights derived from patristic theology and 
contemporary Pauline scholarship and cannot be separated from them.  (iii) His integration of 
science and theology provides the basis for a renewed evolutionary natural theology which 
supplants the traditional static models developed by William Paley and others.  (iv) 
Teilhard’s natural theology also provides a framework for theological ethical reflection on 
how humanity should act in its capacity as a created co-creator with God.  (v) In later work, 
he considers the implications of his evolutionary theology for the wider universe.  (vi) 
Teilhard thus presents an invigorated natural theology grounded in evolution that confirms 
and completes a dynamic and teleological view of the cosmos. 
 
During his time teaching geology and paleontology at the Institut Catholique in Paris, Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin complained: “Too many evolutionists have, in fact, committed the 
serious mistake of taking their scientific explanation of life for a metaphysical solution of the 
world...  Zoologists have imagined that they have rendered the primal cause useless because 
they were discovering a little more clearly the general structure of its work.”  (Teilhard 
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[1921] 1966a, 22–23) His response is not, however, to oppose materialist cosmology with a 
simple creationist or intelligent design view of the world.  After the so-called “Monkey Trial” 
in Tennessee—which followed the enactment of the Butler Law early in 1925 prohibiting the 
teaching of evolution in schools—he protested that the case displayed a tendency to regard 
evolutionary theory as immoral because “in the name of natural selection it first justifies and 
then teaches a selfish struggle, the precedence of force over right” (Teilhard [1926] 1966a, 
136).1 His point is that the evolutionary process, once correctly understood, itself provides 
evidence supporting the proposition that the world is intelligently designed. 
 
Darwin, Lamarck and Teilhard 
 
Many prominent theological commentators on Teilhard’s evolutionary cosmology have 
supposed that he embraces a purely Darwinian, or even neo-Darwinian, notion of 
evolutionary change.  Jürgen Moltmann, for instance, bases his critique of Teilhard on the 
association of evolution with selection, asserting that “evolution always means selection” and 
the survival of the “most effective and the most adaptable” of beings (Moltmann 1990, 294).  
Teilhard in fact argues specifically against this equation of evolution with Darwinian 
selection, promoting another evolutionary theory to complement the Darwinian one.  
Darwin’s ideas were, at the dawn of the twentieth century, famous throughout the Anglo-
Saxon world, but became widely disseminated in France only during the controversies which 
followed the publication of Bergson’s Creative Evolution in 1907 (Farber 1999, 84–97).  
Even then, Darwinism was never accepted in France as fully as in the English-speaking 
world, Russia or Germany.  The true context for Teilhard’s study of evolution is not 
Darwinian, but Lamarckian (Roberts 2000, 115–118).  Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de 
Monet, Comte de Lamarck, the Napoleonic deist heralded at the base of his statue in the 
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Jardin des Plantes in Paris as « Fondateur de la Doctrine de l’Évolution », argued that all 
organic evolutionary change is governed by a primordial sentiment intérieure situated within 
an overarching teleology provided by a universal power which orders the universe (Lamarck 
[1809] 1984).  These immanentist notions appeared to many of his contemporaries as a 
sceptical challenge to the natural theology of William Paley and the English deists, who 
believed that divine providence was necessarily expressed by a static universe whose creation 
was complete. 
The origins of Lamarck’s theory of evolution are, however, broadly identifiable as 
elements of Aristotelian and scholastic natural law theory (Sloan 1999, 52–83).  Lamarck 
adopted and modified the cosmology of Charles Bonnet, which posited a ubiquitous force 
penetrating and animating all matter in the universe and conserving it by a process of 
continuous creation, sustained by a God who is the cause of all motion (Bonnet 1783, sec. 
VI.ii, I:262–65; sec. XVII.ii, II:174–78).  Lamarck asserts: 
We cannot conceive the production of … the presence and continuance of the 
movements constituting active life, unless we imagine a special exciting cause of 
these movements, a force which animates the organs, controls the activities and all the 
organic functions,—a spring, in short, of which the permanent though variable tension 
is the driving energy of all vital movements.  (Lamarck [1809] 1984, 211) 
Lamarck, as has already been suggested, did not himself develop a specifically theological 
cosmology, being an inheritor of the strict separationist view of the relation between nature 
and God which had persisted through the long era in France when high scholasticism reigned 
supreme.2  In a curious way, however, his cosmology was no less “religious” than that of his 
deist theological contemporaries in England, as neither perceived any need to present an 
account of continuing divine action on the material world. 
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Teilhard makes explicit the theological implications of Lamarckism in order to 
compensate the deficiencies he finds in Darwinism.  The clear contrasts he identifies between 
Lamarckian evolution and its Anglo-Saxon equivalent first need to be noted.  Darwin had 
believed humanity’s external natural environment to be the fundamental factor determining 
its evolution, whose dynamic consists, in Teilhard’s words, in the “automatic selection of the 
more stable (or progressive) groupings among the immense number of combinations 
fortuitously and incessantly produced in Nature.”  “Automatic” selection implies that 
evolution is externally governed and operates randomly, thus generating outcomes that 
statistical laws are able to predict.  Lamarck maintained, in contrast, that the internal 
motivation of beings performs a decisive function in their evolution, which is “being 
conceived and ensued by psychic forces analogous to our human power of invention” 
(Teilhard [1947] 1964, 199).  In other words, evolution is not governed by solely external 
factors, being a partly intentional process and not an entirely random one. 
The positive achievement of both Lamarck and Darwin was to free natural history 
from the “cold, abstract Linnaean categories” which classified a fixed order of species by 
observing the external appearance of their members.  Nevertheless, Teilhard asserts, the 
theories of both men contain a “great deal of defective explanation and false philosophy.”  In 
particular, neither includes in its explanation a primal transcendent cause of material 
existence or evolutionary change (Teilhard [1925; 1921] 1966, 81, 7, 25).  Darwinian theory 
suffers, however, from an additional serious shortcoming, which is its concept of the 
“survival of the fittest.”  This suggests, on the basis of observation of the natural world, that 
the beings which survive will be the ones best fitted to their environment.  Teilhard criticizes 
this hypothesis on the grounds that it presupposes a “tenacious sense of conservation, of 
survival” for which random processes alone are not able to account (Teilhard [1950] 1978a, 
233–34).  The notion of survival fails to provide a convincing explanation of the desire of 
 6 
beings, and especially human beings, to persist in being and develop greater organic 
complexity, which Teilhard often describes as a “zest for life.”  He accepts that, among the 
human species, natural selection remains the dominant motivating force of evolution.  
Selection is nevertheless complemented by the power of what he calls invention.  A purely 
biological theory of evolution which allows no place for this spiritual initiative “diminishes” 
and “dethrones” humanity by failing to account for the power inherent in specifically human 
evolution (Teilhard [1952, 1950] 1964, 298, 293).  Inventive capacity is, as I will later 
explain, ever more clearly manifested in modern technological achievements which are 
enabling humanity to take control of its own evolution and that of the world as a whole. 
Teilhard’s critique of Darwinism could be challenged on the grounds that Teilhard 
fails to recognize the extent to which Darwin himself comes to accept his indebtedness to 
Lamarck.  Teilhard, in common with many of his most trenchant modern critics like Peter 
Medawar and Stephen Jay Gould, accepts uncritically the classic view of Darwin as 
defending the view that selection by external natural processes provides a comprehensive and 
sufficient explanation of evolutionary change.  In fact, Darwin acknowledged the pioneering 
work of the “justly-celebrated naturalist” Lamarck on the descent of species, including the 
human species, from other non-human species, in his preface to the third edition of the Origin 
(Darwin [1859] 1964, xiii).  It is particularly notable that the concept of “pangenesis”—
which refers to the tendency of biological life to create new forms by means of inherited 
characteristics, generated internally and independent of external selection pressures—recurs 
in Darwin’s works.  This lends weight to the suggestion that he never effected a complete 
break from Lamarckism (Darwin 1899, II:349–99; 1871, 502–503; Hodge 1985, 207–244).  
Close to the opening of the Descent of Man, Darwin accepts Lamarck’s opinion that acquired 
characteristics are axiomatic to evolutionary theory, stating peremptorily: “I have elsewhere 
so fully discussed the subject of Inheritance, that I need here add hardly anything.” (Darwin 
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1882, 27)  He does, in fact, spend the next twenty pages expounding the importance of 
inheritance to evolutionary theory. 
Teilhard does not pursue his own critique of Darwinism via this revisionist route.  In 
fact, he emphasizes Darwinism’s distinctiveness from Lamarckism, arguing that the principal 
distinction in evolutionary theory is between the external transformation of species by natural 
selection, and their internal transformation resulting from invention (Teilhard [1950] 1974, 
203).  He believes strongly that the human phase of evolution is qualitatively different from 
anything that has preceded it on the grounds that humanity, a spiritual being as well as a 
material one, is able to direct evolution.  He therefore connects Lamarck’s sentiment 
intérieure with the advent of self-conscious human life and the stages of evolution 
preparatory to this. 
Teilhard elucidates the relation between the two evolutionary theories in an important 
footnote in The Human Phenomenon in defence of his hypothesis that modern evolution 
possesses a “fundamental impetus.”  This digression should be quoted in its entirety: 
There inevitably will be those who, in one aspect or another of the following 
explanation, manage to find the thought too Lamarckian (with exaggerated emphasis 
on the influence of the “inside” on the organic arrangement of bodies).  But the fact 
should not be overlooked that I have left a fundamental part in the “morphogenic” 
action of instinct, as I understand it here, to the (Darwinian) play of external forces 
and chance.  Life proceeds not only by strokes of luck, but by strokes of luck that are 
recognized and grasped, that is, psychically selected (as I have shown above).  
Understood correctly, Neo-Lamarckian “antichance” is not merely the negation, but 
on the contrary, the utilization of Darwinian chance.  There is a function of 
complementarity between the two factors—a “symbiosis,” one might say. 
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Let me add only that as soon as we allow a place for the fundamental 
(although seldom observed) distinction between a biology of small and of large 
complexes (just as we have a physics of the infinitesimal and of the immense), we 
notice there is reason to separate out two major zones in the unity of the organized 
world and to treat them in different ways: with, on the one hand, (a) the (Lamarckian) 
zone of very large complexes (above all, the human being), where antichance visibly 
predominates; and, on the other, (b) the (Darwinian) zone of small complexes (lower 
living things), where the only way this same antichance can still be perceived beneath 
the veil of chance is by reason or conjecture, that is, indirectly.  (Teilhard [1940] 
2003a, 97–98n) 
Teilhard later employs “Lamarckian evolution” as a synonym for “human evolution,” in 
which “biological evolution, from being passive, becomes active in the pursuit of its purpose” 
(Teilhard [1950] 1974, 203).  He does not mean to argue however, whether here or 
elsewhere, that evolution is entirely purposive: this would amount to a denial of the role in 
evolution of unconscious growth and the other forms of passivity over which humanity has 
no control (Haught 2005, 5–20).  Rather, evolution is the outcome of the shifting combination 
of a selective external principle with an inventive inner one.  Teilhard describes these dual 
principles of specifically human evolution as le dedans (the “inside” or “within”) and le 
dehors (the “outside” or “without”).3  In the coexistence of the two tendencies in human 
evolution, external selection dominates interior invention, which despite its apparent 
inferiority to selection nevertheless comes to assume decisive importance.  Reflecting on 
selection, Teilhard states: 
Compared with this immense passive field (the Darwinian) it may seem that the 
(Lamarckian) ground gained by our inventive efforts amounts to very little.  But let us 
make no mistake about it.  However slight the growth may be, however small the seed, 
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it is precisely here that the power of renewal and rebounding of the living world is 
concentrated.  (Teilhard [1950] 1974, 201) 
Invention by no means liberates humanity from its dependence on random selective 
processes.  It does, however, offer to humankind the means of intervening in and harnessing 
those processes in order to promote its own flourishing.  In due course, I will consider a 
practical example of how this may occur.  I now wish, in the remainder of the article, to 
consider the theological implications of this cosmology as Teilhard expounds them in relation 
to the different stages of the evolutionary process. 
 
Primordial Multiplicity and the Fall into Complex Being 
 
Teilhard’s evolutionary cosmology is often presumed to apply solely to the planet Earth, and 
not to the wider universe.  In fact, during the final decade of his life, Teilhard argued that the 
evolution of the universe can be accounted for by the same fundamental principles.  Indeed, it 
is at these origins of Teilhard’s evolutionary cosmology that the foundations of his principle 
of convergence are laid.  Teilhard questions the view that red shift—the phenomenon of the 
reddening of the galaxies—is due to their movement away from an initial explosion in which 
space was created and to the corresponding decreased frequency of the light waves, rather 
than to other process such as photon decay (Teilhard [1951] 1978a, 283).  He advocates 
instead the view of the big bang associated with James Jeans, that the world consisted, in its 
earliest period, of a diffused atmosphere of extremely low density, which he terms a 
“primordial chaos”.4  Because this atmosphere was subject to gravitational instability, and as 
the result of a slight disturbance to its composition—a contingency which was bound to 
arise—it began to disintegrate into parts that formed immense clumps from which galaxies 
were born.  The same disruptive process then operated within the individual galaxies, 
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generating smaller clumps out of which stars were born, and so on, creating progressively 
more complex entities. 
Teilhard develops this theme of creation as an intensification of the density of being 
theologically by drawing on an interpretation of the Garden of Eden narrative in the homily 
of Gregory of Nazianzus “On the Theophany, or Birthday of Christ,” which he says “explains 
the expulsion from Eden as the fall into a ‘denser’ form of life” (Teilhard [1947] 1974, 
191n7).  Of Adam’s rejection from paradise, Gregory states: 
For his sin he was banished, at once from the Tree of Life, and from Paradise, and 
from God; and put on the coats of skins … that is, perhaps, the thicker [sic] flesh, both 
mortal and contradictory.  (Gregory 1961, sec. 12, 348; see Genesis 3:21) 
The standard translation of this passage presents the coats of skins as signifying the “coarser” 
flesh, but this imputes to them a penitential status and thereby imposes on the passage a 
moral sense that is not Gregory’s principal concern.  The image of “thicker skins” (Winslow 
1979, 68–69) is closer to what Teilhard correctly believes the essential meaning of the 
expulsion from Eden to be: not a fall from a sanctified spiritual state into sinful embodiment, 
but a change in the nature of embodiment and an increase in the weight of the flesh.5  This 
echoes suggestively Jeans’ conclusions about the origins of the universe in matter of 
extremely low density forming progressively larger masses.  It is a more useful image for 
Teilhard of the origins of life because it avoids the suggestion that the act of creation is 
localized at a single infinitely small point of space and a specific originating point of time.  
That is, as I will show, closer to the imagery he employs to portray the end of evolution. 
Any theological account of creation is inevitably bound up with the question of the 
origins of sin.  Teilhard understands sin as primarily a state of necessary multiplicity, 
plurality and ontological deficiency: sin does not, in other words, originate in a contingent 
event within creation that might not have occurred, but is a condition for creation.  This 
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conception of an original fall into being provides the launching point for his theory of 
evolution, which describes a creative and redemptive process in which the world is drawn 
towards an ever closer unity and self-consciousness which it originally lacked.  Sin is the 
“essential reaction of the finite to the creative act” and the “reverse side of all creation.”  In 
his unpublished journal, Teilhard writes of sin: 
It isn’t an act committed within the universe; —It is an event which accompanied the 
formation of the universe, so as to mix itself completely with creation, before all time 
and all space.  Original sin is implicated in the initial creation of the world.  —As far 
as we can see, behind and around us, everything is under sin—but also under Christ.  
—It corresponds to a fall into being, to a universal materialization which Christ’s 
influence causes to emerge into spirit.6 
Sin therefore makes possible the subsequent emergence of complex beings.  Only following 
the creative act of which the “reverse side” is sin may any subsequent events involving 
complex created beings occur. 
Teilhard defines complexity in terms of both essence and relation.  Beings need to be 
understood in themselves, but also in terms of their connexions with other beings. 
Complexity depends, he states 
not only on the number and diversity of the elements included in each case, but at 
least as much on the number and correlative variety of the links formed between these 
elements.  It is not, therefore, a matter of simple multiplicity but of organized 
multiplicity; not simple complication but centrated complication.  (Teilhard [1944] 
1964, 105) 
Teilhard presents this complexity as a consoling antidote to a view of the cosmos as a vast, 
inhospitable realm in which the whole of planetary life, including human life, is no more than 
a brief interlude between primal soup and eternal death.  A proper appraisal of the importance 
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of complexity requires, he affirms, a “complete reversal of values and perspective” (Teilhard 
[1944] 1964, 108).  The Pascalian fear of the great, infinite and primitive spaces of the 
cosmos is answered, he suggests, by the fact of the existence of localized entities and 
communities of entities.  Consider the largest objects in the universe, composed of simple 
combinations of nuclei and electrons such as hydrogen, in which material evolution is unable 
to progress much beyond a simple atomic series.  In the face of such a void as this, any 
complex life, let alone human life, might appear meaningless.  On planets, clearly far smaller 
entities, there can however occur the “mysterious ascent of the world into the sphere of 
advanced complexity.”  The highest current manifestation of complexity is human life, which 
is characterized by consciousness, reflective capacity and personality.  It is in smaller 
formations that the real significance of complex life, in both essence and relation, is to be 
uncovered. 
 
Convergence, Humanity and Christ 
 
The detailed paleonotological research underlying Teilhard’s theory of evolutionary 
convergence has, to a considerable extent, been superseded by more recent research in the 
fields of paleobiology and genetics.  Many of the theories he develops nevertheless remain 
strikingly apposite to current debates.  He states, for instance, that one “sign for the naturalist 
of the origin of a living branch is a certain convergence of that branch’s axis with the axis of 
neighbouring branches” (Teilhard [1940] 2003a, 125–26).  In the course of his many years of 
research and excavation, especially in China, Teilhard realized that the range of actual 
evolutionary mutations was small in comparison with the number of possible ones and 
recognized the rapid speed with which evolutionary change occurred.  Both these factors 
suggested to him that something more than purely random processes was at work in 
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generating evolutionary change.  Teilhard’s perspective is supported by the array of evidence 
recently presented by Simon Conway Morris in support of the ubiquity of evolutionary 
convergence in a universe of exuberant biological diversity (Conway Morris 2005a, 2005b).  
Conway Morris portrays evolution as unfolding according to a necessarily preordained path, 
although draws, as will be seen, very different theological conclusions from this fact. 
The implications of convergence and complexity for natural theology are, indeed, 
underdeveloped in current debates both within the philosophy of religion and in the field of 
science and religion.  The conclusions which Teilhard draws from his combined scientific 
research and theological reflection have the potential to reinvigorate these discourses.  
Teilhard insists that God should not be conceived as a static pole of consistence governing a 
stable world, but as a prime mover ahead.  He proposes: “The Higher Life, the Union, the 
long dreamed-of consummation that has hitherto been sought Above, in the direction of some 
kind of transcendence: should we not rather look for it Ahead, in the prolongation of the 
inherent forces of evolution?”7  God the pole of consistence becomes, in Teilhard’s 
theological cosmology, God the “Prime Mover, Gatherer and Consolidator, ahead of us, of 
evolution” (Teilhard 1966b, 121).  In light perhaps of statements such as these, Arthur 
Peacocke has noted the tendency of “Teilhardian theologians” to “extrapolate into the future 
from the past” (Peacocke 1979, 338–339, 349), but Teilhard’s own concept of the God Ahead 
is derived principally from the God Above rather than from the Bergsonian notion of an 
original primordial unity possessing quasi-theistic attributes.  A profound continuity certainly 
exists between the God Ahead and previous evolutionary history.  Nevertheless, looking at 
the matter from the temporal human perspective to which Peacocke refers, the God Ahead 
provides the evolutionary dynamic with a source which subsists in the future and draws the 
world towards its final consummation. 
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This concept of a God of the Ahead has implications for an understanding of the 
person of Jesus Christ.  Teilhard is determined to develop a clear and dynamic alternative to 
modernist christology, which had its basis in the historical criticism of scripture.  Pope Pius 
X’s 1907 encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis charges the modernists with calling into 
question the divine nature of Christ, by “not sparing even the person of the Divine Redeemer, 
whom, with sacrilegious daring, they reduce to a simple, mere man” (sec. 2; Papal 
Encyclicals III:71).  Teilhard’s position supports this critique.  The reading of scripture is not, 
he believes, a purely exegetical activity, but a synthetic one.8  Personal faith, church tradition, 
and the various fields of scientific research all bring crucial insights to bear on our reading of 
the sacred texts.  The modernists failed fully to accept this basic principle, but so did the 
church authorities attacking them.  Teilhard protests: 
One cannot remain true to Catholicism and be content with a mediocre explanation, a 
limited outlook which represents Christ as an accident of history, isolating Him in the 
Cosmos as if He were an episode without proper time and place.  (Teilhard [1919] 
1976, 23) 
The coming of Christ into the human world is not completed in the birth of Jesus in Palestine.  
Rather, this particular historical event inaugurates the entry of the whole created order into 
Christ.  Incarnation, far from being confined to a discrete event at a particular point in 
historical time, is an ongoing movement that transforms the world and creates the historical 
reality it enters.  Although exemplified by the entry of Jesus Christ into the human world to 
assume human form, its final purpose is the redemption of the whole cosmos.  Teilhard 
affirms: 
The Incarnation is a making new, a restoration, of all the universe’s forces and 
powers; Christ is the Instrument, the Centre, the End, of the whole of animate and 
 15 
material creation; through him, everything is created, sanctified, and vivified.  
(Teilhard [1916] 1968, 58) 
The divine nature of Jesus Christ, his eternal birth in the Godhead, and his work of 
redemption and salvation transform material life through the whole range of its levels of 
being.  In order that the world be redeemed, it is necessary for Christ to “enter into contact 
with every one of the zones of the created, from the lowest and most earthly to the zone that 
is closest to heaven” (Teilhard [1923] 1974, 71). 
 
Consummation and Omega 
 
A wholly naturalistic explanation of human evolution, whether Darwinian or Lamarckian, 
would, as has just been suggested, fail to take account of the full significance of the 
incarnation for material life.  In an early encyclopedia essay, however, Teilhard excludes a 
purely natural evolutionism on different grounds: that it would be incompatible with essential 
axioms of church teaching.  He states: 
We conclude by rejecting necessarily an evolutionism which, linking humanity in the 
fullness of its being to inferior life forms or to matter, regards it only as the product of 
a transformation—whether from like to like, by the reshaping of primitive 
compounds—or from lesser to greater, by increases (which were due to a divine 
source), that will not culminate in an unanticipated and profound reordering, a rending 
of the vital current, placing humanity in a region of transcendence and stability.  
(Teilhard [1912] 1924–28, sec. 505, my trans.) 
Intrinsic to Teilhard’s belief that the universe will undergo this final consummation is the 
Pauline theology of the cosmic role of Christ, developed by Paul in order to take full account 
of the implications for humanity and the cosmos of the fact that the whole fullness of God 
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dwells bodily in Christ, who is “He in whom everything is reunited, and in whom all things 
are consummated—through whom the whole created edifice receives its consistency—Christ 
dead and risen, who fills all things, in whom all things consist.” (Teilhard 2004, 84)9  
Teilhard thus insists on the necessity of both Christ’s natures—the human as well as the 
spiritual—describing Christ, in words which gloss perhaps four scriptural passages, as 
the Alpha and the Omega, the principle and the end, the foundation stone and the 
keystone, the Plenitude and the Plenifier.  He is the one who consummates all things 
and gives them their consistence.  It is towards him and through him, the inner life and 
light of the world, that the universal convergence of all created spirit is effected in 
sweat and tears.  He is the single centre, precious and consistent, who glitters at the 
summit that is to crown the world, at the opposite pole from those dim and eternally 
shrinking regions into which our science ventures when it descends the road of matter 
and the past.  (Teilhard [1921] 1968, 34–35)10 
This salvation which Christ-Omega accomplishes is at once spiritual, being a transformation 
of material life according to a non-material principle, and cosmic, affecting the entire created 
order.  The end which it presents to history and which gives history its linear direction 
contradicts the cyclical models which prevailed in pre-Christian philosophy (Benz 1966, 67–
68).  The view of historical development characteristic of modernity is, in other words, 
established by Christian theology and made a reality in the unceasing redemptive action of 
Christ on the world. 
Teilhard finds particular inspiration for this christological reading of the modern 
linear concept of historical progression in some of the Greek Fathers, who transpose the 
“evidence of Revelation into a universe of the non-static type.”  He appropriates, more 
specifically, the cosmology of Irenaeus of Lyons, which he describes as an “astonishing 
anticipation of our modern views of progress” (Teilhard [1946] 1968b, 189; [1939] 1969, 
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167n).  It must be emphasized, however, that the type of progress which Irenaeus conceives is 
only progress because it is informed by a spiritual principle which constitutes and affirms 
human life, and in so doing transforms that life.  Omega is, in theological terms, the point at 
which “Christic faith comes in to take over from and to consummate faith in humanity” 
(Teilhard [1948] 1975, 203).  It is the point at which the unsatisfied hopes and uncompleted 
projects of humanity are gathered up and consummated in Christ, and not an end-point of 
history attained by human effort alone. 
 
The Future of Evolution 
 
Teilhard portrays humankind “now standing upon its own feet” and “entering into a new era 
of autonomous control and self-orientation” (Teilhard [1948] 1975, 181).  What does this 
mean in practice?  The best example of the human appropriation of natural forces that 
occurred during Teilhard’s lifetime is nuclear fission.  Reflecting on this technological 
advance, he avers that humankind “has succeeded in seizing and manipulating the sources 
commanding the very origins of matter” (Teilhard [1946] 1964, 142; [1953] 1978a, 347–57).  
This is clearly an ambivalent achievement, however, containing the potential to generate 
energy to preserve human life as well as to construct weapons capable of obliterating that life.  
Teilhard expresses similar ambivalence over genetic manipulation, observing how 
humankind feels itself to be “on the verge of acquiring the power of physico-chemical control 
of the operations of heredity and morphogenesis in the depths of its own being” (Teilhard 
[1948, 1947] 1964, 234, 197).  He states: 
As a direct result of its socialization, humankind is beginning, with rational design, to 
take over the biological motive forces which determine its growth—in other words, it 
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is becoming capable of modifying, or even of creating, its own self.  (Teilhard [1948] 
1975, 181) 
Biological realities no longer provide a fixed set of conditions within which humanity makes 
moral decisions.  They are more likely to become products of those decisions which 
themselves construct the human subject and thus condition his or her subsequent moral 
choices.  The classic order of a shared conception of static human nature generating an ethic 
which epistemologically grounds a moral framework and motivates adherence to it no longer 
applies: “Material determinisms,” Teilhard states, “cease to provide the skeleton of the world; 
they are merely a secondary effect in the cosmos.”  (Teilhard [1931, 1937] 1969, 29, 102) 
Teilhard believes passionately that theological and ethical principles need to be 
developed to enable modern humanity to make sense of its tremendous powers over matter 
and to exercise those powers responsibly and constructively.  Moral questions surrounding 
the use of technology to intervene in biological processes have evidently become more 
sharply focused since his lifetime, simply because they are a product of the ever increasing 
number of technologies actually available or under development.  Teilhard’s general analysis 
of these questions nevertheless remains pertinent, and is in places prophetic.  Humankind’s 
production of new technology is, he observes, “more and more patently exceeding its powers 
of absorption and assimilation” (Teilhard [1931] 1969, 36–37).  Jürgen Habermas, in the 
course of making a similar point, describes this progressive estrangement of material 
production from consciousness as “dissonance of intention,” and argues that what is needed 
to counteract it is a renewed understanding of the fusion of nature and soul (Habermas 2003, 
60–64).  Teilhard expresses a corresponding belief in his frequent statements that the ordering 
of nature by soul is needed to provide the cosmos with its telos (Teilhard [1917] 1968a, 168; 
[1921] 1968b, 29–30).  The organization of technical production in accordance with moral 
and religious principles is, in other words, a real possibility, and moreover essential for the 
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future flourishing of the human species.  Modern technology, far from being a Promethean 
theft from the deity of a power which is rightly its own (Teilhard [1946] 1964, 147), in fact 
promotes a necessary sharing by humankind in God’s creative power.  To foster human co-
operation in this divine action is the new task for theology and theological ethics. 
Teilhard reflects much later on the likely course of the evolution of concrete human 
life in the more distant future.  There is no reason, he argues, to suppose that life will not 
evolve more complex forms than its present ones (Teilhard [1944] 1964, 113).  Nevertheless, 
humankind also contemplates its finitude and fragility, the prospect of decline and the 
possibility of disaster.  This more pessimistic and obscure strand in Teilhard’s thought about 
the future is based on an appraisal of the human condition rather than on any specific events: 
it must be remembered that he is writing before the mass production and stockpiling of 
nuclear weaponry, and prior to humankind’s awareness of the rapid pace of global 
environmental change.  He is brought to contemplate the death of the human species simply 
because it is dependent on the sun, which is a “heavenly body whose days are ultimately 
numbered” (Teilhard [1944] 1964, 121).  He responds with scepticism to the possibility that a 
future ability to colonize other planets will make human existence everlasting, regarding the 
technological obstacles of travel to suitable destinations as insurmountable, not to mention 
the difficulties of generating the basic elements required for survival once in a new location.  
In any case, he continues, if interstellar travel by conscious material beings were possible, 
then the Earth would probably already have been invaded and colonized by other such 
beings.  Teilhard speculates that the future for the universe will be a death of the materially 
embodied dimension of human life in which humankind’s spiritual component will become 
detached from the planet Earth and unified with the Omega point on which not only Earthly 
evolution converges, but the evolution of the entire universe as well (Teilhard [1944] 1964, 
122–23). 
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 The principal shortcomings of Teilhard’s evolutionary cosmology are to be found in 
his theological analysis of its universal dimension.  He regards the existence of complex, 
intelligent life on some of the other planets in the immensity of the universe as a virtual 
certainty—after all, the diameter of the Earth’s orbit compared with that of the universe is in 
the same order of proportion as that of a pinhead on the surface of the American continent 
(Teilhard [1953] 1974, 231; [1944] 1964, 101).  This raises the question of the status of 
Christ as universal savior: was the coming of Christ on Earth sufficient to extend the 
possibility of salvation to the entire universe?  Teilhard regards his single earthly incarnation 
as indeed sufficient for the whole universe, stating: “For the universe is so perfectly one that 
the Son of God has only to enter into it once in order to occupy and permeate it in its entirety 
with his filiating grace...  He had to be born but once of the Virgin Mary to make his own and 
divinize the whole of creation.”  (Teilhard [1953] 1974, 235, n11)  It would, perhaps, be more 
convincing to argue that whilst the eternally begotten Son, existing beyond time and space, 
would be a feature common to Christian faith on any planet, the historical person of Christ 
would be incarnated separately on different planets.  This would preserve the unity-in-
diversity for which Teilhard strives, whilst ensuring that the person of the incarnate Christ 
was similar to that of all possible beings with faith in him and thus able to share their life in 
meaningful, tangible ways.  An entirely separate problem surrounding the “single 
incarnation” view is how the revelation of Christ on Earth could be communicated from Earth 
to other parts of the universe by natural means.  The scepticism with which Teilhard regards 
the possibility of interstellar travel has already been noted. 
The new vistas and possibilities opened by technologies such as genetic manipulation 
are in any case far more significant for the future of humanity than the possibility of its 
colonization of other planets.  Advances in genetic understanding enable humankind to 
reinvent itself as the co-creator of its future essence.  The inextricable link between evolution 
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and complexity, confirmed by faith in a personal deity, calls the Christian scientist to focus 
attention on current human life on this planet.  This is where the depth, complexity and future 
potential of life reside, ordered by Christ’s providential action in human creativity. 
Teilhard’s determination to take the theological implications of complexity as 
seriously as those of convergence leads him to a more positive appraisal of the existential 
situation which evolution produces than the one recently suggested by Simon Conway 
Morris, who infers that evolutionary convergence generates “inevitable humans in a lonely 
universe” (Conway Morris, 2005a).  Teilhard wishes, in contrast, to consider the theological 
implications of complexity alongside those of convergence.  Complexity makes possible new 
centers of consciousness and community which manifest their own creative capacity.  The 
convergent universe is no longer lonely, Teilhard argues, having created, in its comparatively 
recent past, complex beings and communities capable of communication, conversation, 
friendship, love and praise. 
Teilhard’s evolutionary natural theology provides a constructive Christian response to 
Michael Ruse’s call for a “kind of reinvigorated Lamarckism” to contribute to a restoration of 
the credibility of natural theology in the face of crude intelligent design arguments (Ruse 
2003, 304).  Teilhard unsettles simple modern oppositions, grounding his cosmology in faith, 
theology and religious experience as well as evidence from scientific research, both his own 
and others’.  In The Human Phenomenon, he states of the Omega Point: “I probably would 
never have dared to consider or form the rational hypothesis of it, if I had not already found 
in my consciousness as a believer not only the speculative model for it, but its living reality.”  
(Teilhard 2003a, 211)  This living reality was his faith in Christ, who reveals himself in 
evolution as the principle of the creation, conservation and consummation of the universe.  
Teilhard’s dynamic vision is far removed from the static cosmology of William Paley, which 
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remains the ubiquitous textbook example of natural theology.  It provides suggestive 
openings for a more current and more arresting version. 
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1 The defendant John Scopes, a science teacher, was found guilty of infringing the prohibition and fined $100.  
See McGowen 1990. 
2 The classic critique of this “pure nature” tradition is De Lubac [1965] 1998. 
3 The terms in each bracket are those used in the new and original translations respectively (Teilhard 2003a, 
1959). 
4 Teilhard [1946] 1964, 102; Jeans 1902, 1–53; 1919, 188–202; 1929, 345–50.  He regards this cosmology as 
not incompatible with Georges Lemaître’s view of the universe expanding in(to) space from a primitive atom 
(Teilhard [1948] 1978b, 148; Heller 2003; 1995, 12). 
5 Retreat note of 25 July 1922 in Teilhard 2003b, 101; see also extensive notes in unpublished Journal, 9–18 
May 1921, cahier VIII. 
6 Entry in unpublished Journal, 29 May 1920, cahier VIII, my trans. 
7 Teilhard [1949] 1964, 263.  The context makes clear that Above and Ahead are not being presented as mutually 
exclusive terms.  Similar dialectics are identifiable in the discussion of the interrelations of creation, history and 
eschatology in Moltmann 2003. 
8 See notes in unpublished Journal, 1 January 1945, cahier XIII. 
9 For the origins of this christology in Pauline scholarship of the early twentieth century, see Grumett 2005, 
114–116. 
10 Cf. Revelation 22:13, Colossians 1:17, John 8:12, Romans 8:22. 
